Economic crisis and restructuring in South Korea by Hart-Landsberg, Martin & Burkett, Paul
ECONOMIC CRI SI S
AND RESTRUCTURING
IN SOUTH  KOREA
Beyond the Free Market-Statist Debate
Martin H art-Landsberg and P aul  B urkett
This paper, which examines the causes of the South Korean crisis in 1997-98 and the
nature and consequences of the post-crisis restructuring process, looks critically at
the neoliberal position but also at what the authors call the statist position (which
celebrated and continues to defend the usefulness of industrial policy and state di-
rection of the economy against neoliberal critics). While there are important differ-
ences between these approaches, the authors show that because both ignore the
structural causes of South Korea’s crisis, neither is able to explain, much less help
overcome it. The paper then examines the economic, political, and social effects of
the restructuring process, demonstrating how it has left the South Korean economy
more dominated by foreign capital and the chaebol, and more dependent on ex-
ports and labor exploitation than before the crisis. As a result, South Korea appears
headed for a new crisis. The authors conclude by highlighting ongoing worker resis-
tance to the restructuring process and a movement-building strategy for advancing
a worker/community-centered recovery and development program.
South Korea has long been an ideological battleground for free market and stat-
ist development advocates. For decades the battle was over competing explana-
tions for South Korea’s economic success. Those arguments ended with the
crisis of 1997-98. Now the arguments mainly concern what went wrong in
South Korea.
Free market economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) blame
the recent crisis in South Korea on misguided and corrupt investment and lend-
ing decisions produced by state industrial policies geared toward the growth
of big family-controlled conglomerates (known as chaebol). In their view,
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sustained recovery requires the abandonment of nationalistic industrial poli-
cies, corporate downsizing (including the breakup of the overextended chae-
bol), more rigorous and open accounting practices, and a greater role for for-
eign capital in shaping and disciplining economic activity.1
In contrast, statist economists highlight the successes of past government in-
dustrial policies — in particular, the development of a globally competitive
manufacturing sector, the generation of rapid economic growth for several de-
cades, and rising real wages for the majority of South Korean workers. They ar-
gue that the crisis was due more to “underregulation” than overregulation. Spe-
cifically, they point to the liberalization of the South Korean financial system in
the 1990s and the abandonment of the state’s earlier policy of planning and co-
ordinating investments. Their prescription for economic renewal is the re-
regulation of the financial system (especially short-term cross-border capital
flows) and the reimposition of a rational industrial policy.2
While this free-market/statist dichotomy sets the terms for public and schol-
arly debates over the lessons to be learned from the South Korean experience,
the differences between these two approaches are not as great as commonly
thought. For example, although the two sides differ on the importance and de-
sirability of industrial policy, both embrace capitalism as the only effective
means for achieving development. As a result, both largely ignore consider-
ations of class and contradictions in their analyses of South Korean capitalism.
In this paper we offer a radically different understanding of South Korea’s
past growth and recent crisis and, by extension, strategies for promoting devel-
opment. While recognizing the centrality of industrial policy to South Korean
growth, we believe that this policy, and the underlying state-chaebol relation-
ship, can only be understood in class terms. Such a class perspective helps illu-
minate the exploitative and contradictory nature of South Korea’s growth tra-
jectory and thus the structural causes of the 1997-98 economic collapse. In
short, it reveals that South Korea is suffering a crisis that is rooted in the work-
ings of capitalism.
It also makes clear that neither market liberalization nor reregulation can
successfully promote South Korean development. Rather, what is needed is a
worker/community-led socialization of the chaebol and government bodies,
and the replacement of anarchic market forces with cooperative-democratic de-
cision-making mechanisms. And, in contrast to both free market and statist per-
spectives that see current working-class resistance to capitalist restructuring as
problematic because it disrupts their respective market-driven or techno-
cratically planned growth strategies, we believe that such struggles represent
the only way to advance this necessary process of democratic socialization.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: Section I examines the neoliberal-statist
debate over industrial policy, highlighting the statist perspective. Section II of-
fers a critical look at statist understandings of the South Korean model by show-
ing how the country’s recent crisis was caused by internally generated contra-
dictions. Section III scrutinizes neoliberal and statist responses to the crisis and
demonstrates how neither approach is able to grasp the structural nature of
South Korea’s crisis and thus offer socially useful policy advice. Sections IV and
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V investigate the economic effects of the post-crisis restructuring process, ex-
plaining why it is being driven by neoliberal policies and promoting outcomes
such as denationalization and the concentration and centralization of power.
Section VI investigates the social impact of the restructuring process, revealing
the devastating costs working people are being forced to pay as policy makers
seek to restore capitalist profitability and competitiveness. The last section
highlights worker resistance to neoliberal restructuring and proposes an alter-
native strategy for advancing a worker/community-centered recovery and devel-
opment program that rejects neoliberal and statist assumptions of TINA (“there
is no alternative” to capitalism).
I . The Debate over Industrial  Pol icy
South Korea enjoyed rapid economic growth for over three decades prior to its
1997-98 crisis. The country’s real GDP grew by an average of 9 percent during
the 1960s, 9.3 percent during the 1970s, and by nearly 10 percent during the
1980s and the first half of the 1990s. This performance is even more impressive
in comparative terms. From 1978 to 1987, South Korea’s real GDP growth aver-
aged 7.7 percent, compared to only 3.1 percent for Western developing coun-
tries (defined as all Western hemispheric countries other than Canada and the
United States) and 2.1 percent for African countries. From 1988 through 1995,
South Korean growth averaged 8.1 percent per year; in the same period, West-
ern and African developing countries averaged only 2.4 and 2.2 percent annual
growth, respectively.3
Equally significant, this growth was achieved through a massive structural
transformation of the economy. The share of manufacturing in output and em-
ployment rose from only 10 percent in 1962 to well over 25 percent by the early
1990s. Commodity exports grew at an annual average rate of more than 25 per-
cent over the same period.4 By 1996, South Korea ranked as the number one
“supplier of computer memory chips, the second largest shipbuilder in the
world, the third largest producer of semiconductors, the fourth largest maker of
electronics, the fifth largest car maker, and the largest steel producer.”5 On the
strength of this performance, South Korea went from being a “basket case” in
the 1950s to a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) in 1996.
Neoliberal economists credited the “magic of the market” for this success.
For example, in a 1987 study for the Institute for International Economics, Bela
Balassa and John Williamson argued that South Korea and other newly industri-
alizing countries (NICs) in East Asia had outperformed the Latin American NICs
and India because:
the scope of administrative controls was much more limited in the four
East Asian NICs than in Latin America and, even more, India. In the latter
case, there were pervasive controls on investment, prices, and imports,
and decisions were generally made case by case, thereby creating uncer-
tainty for business and opportunities for corruption, which has remained
comparatively limited in East Asia.…Capital markets, too, were freer in the
East Asian NICs than in Latin America and India.6
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However, most neoliberal economists had little knowledge of the specifics of
the South Korean experience. Statist economists, in particular, sought to chal-
lenge the neoliberal view by demonstrating the centrality of industrial policy to
South Korea’s rapid industrial transformation and growth. Their work revealed
that control over the country’s financial system was probably the single most
important factor enabling the state to successfully direct the economy. In the
words of the South Korean economist Wontack Hong:
The success of Korea’s export-oriented growth owes very much to the late
President Park’s effort to establish an automatic loan allocation system for
exporters.…Under Park’s regime (1961-1979), any entrepreneur could
automatically attain access to short-term bank credits at subsidized inter-
est rates without collateral by undertaking export-related activities.…The
efficiency of credit rationing was maintained by the efficiency of Korea’s
export sector.7
This export promotion was undertaken as part of a comprehensive effort to
promote national industrial development. This effort is best illustrated by the
government’s mid-1970s push to establish new heavy and chemical industries
for both import-substitution and export-generating purposes. Using cheap
credit, the government directed investment into iron and steel, petrochemicals,
electronics, machinery, and transport equipment. In exchange for achievement
of export goals, the government provided numerous subsidies to its favored en-
terprises; prominent among them was the ability to generate a high rate of
profit in a protected domestic market.
As a key part of this industrial upgrading the government determined which
industries to develop and which products to produce and then selected a small
number of chaebol to carry out the production. Each chaebol created numer-
ous subsidiaries in response to government policy; although each subsidiary
had its own president, they all remained operationally unified under the direc-
tion of the chair of the chaebol group. This organizational form allowed the
chaebol to expand rapidly from one industry into another in response to gov-
ernment initiatives.
A case in point: in the early 1970s, the government pressured Hyundai into
shipbuilding. Hyundai had no experience in this industry but Hyundai Ship-
building and Heavy Industries was able to compensate for this shortcoming by
drawing on the engineering and construction expertise of Hyundai Construc-
tion, the workplace organizational knowledge of Hyundai Motors, and the pro-
duction control experience of Hyundai Cement. Within the unified structure of
the chaebol, engineers, supervisors, managers, workers, and funds were easily
transferred from one subsidiary to another as needed. Moreover, Hyundai
could draw upon the profits of its more established subsidiaries to balance its
early losses in shipbuilding.
Through such a process, the combined sales of the top ten chaebol relative to
GNP grew from 15 percent in 1974 to over 67 percent by 1984.8 As Ajit Singh ob-
served: “The Korean story of successful industrialization in the last three de-
cades is intimately linked with the development and the success of the giant Ko-
rean corporations, the chaebols.”9
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According to statists, the South Korean experience offered support for a new
conventional wisdom. Third world countries could grow under capitalism, but
only if they had strong states to promote and direct economic activity and large,
integrated conglomerates to organize the actual production. This was a far cry
from the original conventional wisdom that emphasized reliance on market
forces to mobilize and coordinate economic activity.
In theorizing why South Korea’s industrial policy had proven so effective,
some statists emphasized the “industrialization through learning” that took
place in South Korea. Through basic education, the skillful use of imported
managers and technicians, a strong negotiating stance vis-à-vis foreign corpora-
tions, and ruthless enforcement of export targets as a condition for enterprise
subsidies (and, in some cases, even of continued enterprise existence), the gov-
ernment was said to have created an institutional environment that promoted
an accumulation of individual and collective human skills in production as well
as the flexibility and adaptability needed to cope with international competition
and changing market opportunities. In shaping this institutional environment,
the government succeeded in walking a fine line between planning and coordi-
nation on the one hand, and exposing the chaebol to domestic and interna-
tional competitive pressures on the other.10
A second, related explanation stressed the non-adversarial character of gov-
ernment-private sector relations. With the government, banks, and chaebol
functioning as a “quasi-internal organization,” the government’s credit-alloca-
tion policies created less conflict and less disruptive rent-seeking behavior than
in other Third World countries.11 Given a commonality of private- and public-
sector goals (partly imposed by military power, to be sure), even corruption
(under-the-table exchanges between the chaebol and government officials) was
said to have been indirectly productive insofar as it helped ensure that indus-
trial policy directives were actually carried out.12
Most statist economists did acknowledge that there was another, less posi-
tive, side to the South Korea’s economic “miracle.” After all, it was impossible to
ignore either the military dictatorship that directed the growth process or the
country’s work-times and industrial accident rates that were among the highest
in the world.
For example, years prior to the publication of her 1989 book extolling the
South Korean model, Alice H. Amsden undertook a study of average rates of sur-
plus value (roughly the value added per worker-hour divided by hourly wages)
in manufacturing over the 1969-77 period. She found that South Korea’s rate
was more than twice India’s: 465 percent compared to 244 percent. This differ-
ential was partly due to South Korea’s 2,519 hours in average yearly work-time
per factory operative compared to India’s 2,311 — the former figure being the
highest among the twenty-one countries surveyed (thirteen of which were
Third World nations).13 However, in their eagerness to discredit neoliberalism
(as opposed to capitalism), statist economists, including Amsden, eventually
came to terms with this reality by arguing that continued growth would eventu-
ally create a strong middle class that would, in turn, transform South Korea into
a liberal capitalist democracy.14
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The growing body of statist work eventually forced neoliberals on the defen-
sive. Pressured by Japan, which wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness of in-
dustrial policy, the World Bank agreed to undertake a study of the East Asian
economic experience.15 Its 1993 report, The East Asian Miracle, granted that
South Korea had made extensive use of industrial policy. However, it then tried
to dismiss the significance of this fact by claiming that since it had proven im-
possible to establish “statistical linkages” between state interventions and
growth, there was little reason to believe that the country’s industrial policy had
been effective.16 This kind of hedging only strengthened the credibility of statist
arguments.
I I . Contradictions and Crisis
Statists had a far better grasp of the South Korean experience than did neo-
liberals. But their work also suffered from serious shortcomings that led them
to confidently predict continued growth for South Korea and success for those
countries willing to adopt the South Korean model. As a result, they were
caught flatfooted by the country’s crisis.
Statist explanations for South Korea’s rapid industrial growth and transfor-
mation emphasized the state’s effective direction of chaebol economic activity.
However, more was involved; additional factors that were downplayed in-
cluded the above-noted exploitation of the country’s work force; chaebol ability
to purchase Japanese technology, components, and machinery; and chaebol ac-
cess to U.S. funds and markets. Also overlooked was the fact that these factors
were shaped by historically specific relations of power that growth itself could
change.
The highpoint for the South Korean model was 1986-89. During these years
the economy recorded annual rates of growth of over 12 percent and its first
trade surpluses. But, at the very moment when statist promotions of the South
Korean model were receiving their most favorable response, tensions and con-
tradictions generated by the country’s growth strategy were beginning to de-
stroy the viability of that strategy.
The chaebol had grown increasingly powerful and were now able to take ad-
vantage of their export successes to gain independence from a weakening state.
This independence allowed them to use their profits for speculative rather than
productive investments. The past industrialization had also created a working
class that was strong enough to directly challenge the country’s repressive labor
laws and chaebol control over the workplace. A massive strike wave began in
1987 that cut into chaebol power and profits. The country’s export successes
also threatened Japanese producers, leading them to withhold key inputs from
chaebol exporters. And they also provoked the U.S. government to successfully
demand that South Korea revalue its currency and open its markets to U.S.
goods and investment.17
These developments quickly began to undermine South Korea’s export drive
and chaebol profitability. The trade balance slipped back into deficit beginning
in 1990; profits and domestic investment began falling. The government tried
to respond to the country’s growing economic problems, but with little success.
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It tried but failed to regain control over chaebol activity, in large part because it
was now too closely tied to their fortunes. There was even less it could do to
force a change in Japanese or U.S. policy. Thus, it settled on a strategy of attack-
ing labor in hopes of stimulating a new round of chaebol productive invest-
ment. But while the working-class movement could be weakened, it could not
be broken.
To make matters worse, the international environment grew increasingly
hostile for South Korea throughout the 1990s. Japanese corporations, seeking
to reduce trade tensions with the United States, had heavily invested in Thai-
land, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This allowed these Southeast Asian countries to
pursue an export-led growth strategy similar to South Korea’s, but with even
cheaper labor costs. China also became a major producer of exports. The result
was regional over-production of cars, steel, petrochemicals, semiconductors,
and consumer electronics, which drove down export prices and earnings
throughout the region. South Korea’s export growth declined from 30 percent
in 1995 to only 5 percent in 1996.18
In addition, U.S. policy makers took advantage of South Korea’s desire to join
the OECD to press for the deregulation of South Korea’s financial system. Faced
with a threatened blackball of its admission, the South Korean government
agreed to open the country’s capital markets and grant domestic firms greater
freedom to borrow from abroad. This, of course, contributed to a further weak-
ening of South Korea’s planning system and encouraged greater foreign debt.19
South Korea began running bigger current account deficits and accumulat-
ing greater foreign debt. The current account deficit rose from $4.5 billion in
1992 to $8.9 billion in 1995, and then to a record $23.7 billion in 1996. In addi-
tion, chaebol profits were forced downward: the forty-nine largest business
groups recorded total profits of just $32 million on combined sales of $274 bil-
lion in 1996 — a return of just over 0.01 percent.20 Companies sustained their
operations only by going deeper into debt. And thanks to the liberalization in
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Sam-mi Steel hunger strikers and their supporters, November 1997. “Workers, to the dis-
appointment of both neoliberals and statists, are increasingly demonstrating their unwill-
ingness to be sacrificed for the benefit of capitalist restructuring efforts.” (Photo: Steve Zeltzer)
foreign borrowing, an increasing percentage of funds came from foreign lend-
ers. By 1997, South Korea’s foreign debt totaled over $160 billion dollars, with
approximately $70 billion due for repayment in less than a year.
Several large and important companies finally went bankrupt in the first half
of 1997. As the financial crisis swept through Southeast Asia, foreign investors
became increasingly concerned about the creditworthiness of South Korean
firms and banks and the adequacy of the central bank’s foreign exchange hold-
ings. They responded by selling stocks and bonds and calling in loans. The gov-
ernment raised interest rates and cut spending, but it was unable to halt the run
on the won; by mid-November, South Korea’s currency was in free fall and the
country was headed into recession.
The crisis brought an abrupt reversal of growth, skyrocketing enterprise and
household bankruptcies, uncollectible debts, and a sharp increase in unem-
ployment and poverty. Two World Bank economists sum up the wreckage as
follows:
As a result of this crisis, Korea experienced the harshest economic reces-
sion of its entire post-war history. Industrial production dropped by 12
per cent between August 1997 and August 1998, while business invest-
ment decreased by 28.3 per cent in the third quarter of 1998 when com-
pared to the same period of the previous year. Corporate bankruptcies
reached an unrecorded high of 3,197 firms during December of 1997
[compared with a monthly average of 965 during 1996]. Layoffs were ex-
tensive, leading to 7.4 per cent unemployment in August 1998.21
I I I . Neol iberal  and Statist Responses to the Crisis
The crisis surprised neoliberals, as well as statists, but they were faster off the
mark with an explanation. Despite having praised South Korea for its free-mar-
ket policies, they quickly blamed the crisis on “crony capitalism.” Statists, un-
able or unwilling to recognize the weaknesses in their approach and thus the
structural nature of the South Korean crisis, remained determined to defend
the South Korean model of capitalist development from its neoliberal critics.
Neoliberals argue that it was misguided and corrupt industrial policies that
caused the 1997-98 crisis. But, as Stephan Haggard observes, the connection
“appears weak” insofar as “industrial policy in Korea peaked during the Heavy
and Chemical Industry Plan of the late 1970s and was gradually dismantled over
the 1980s and 1990s as the country liberalized.” Although it is true that the
government still “played a direct role in bank financing of a number of large
(and dubious) private projects through the state-owned Korean Development
Bank,” this is a thin reed on which to build an explanation of the crisis.22
Neoliberals also argue that foreign financial investors were fooled by the in-
complete or misleading accounting practices of both chaebol firms and the Ko-
rean banks operating as conduits to the chaebol. When the international finan-
cial community became aware of the true balance sheet situation, it rapidly
withdrew its funds, triggering the crisis. But this argument begs the question of
why foreign investors would pour money into an economy the particulars of
which they had no hard information on — and why South Korea should further
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open itself to such questionable decision-making in the wake of the crisis, as
suggested by neoliberals. There is certainly no evidence to support John
Cathie’s claim that “a more liberalized Korea would have weathered the finan-
cial problems in the region, and at a lower economic and social cost, than the
present financial and economic structure will be able to do.”23
The statists are right to point out that it makes more sense to pin the crisis on
underregulation, not overregulation. While neoliberals blame the explosion of
bad domestic and external debts on government interference and corrupt ac-
counting practices, the statists point to the series of financial deregulation mea-
sures implemented throughout the 1990s. Beginning in 1991, interest rates
were gradually liberalized until, by 1997, only demand-deposit rates were not
market-determined. In 1993, the government announced that it would termi-
nate its policy loan program (the sectoral targeting of credit) by 1997. Bank de-
cisions on capital, branching, and dividend payments were deregulated in
1994, and on deposit and loan maturities in 1996.
The years 1990 to 1995 also saw a significant loosening of government con-
trols over the allocation of foreign exchange. As a result, the links between for-
eign exchange transactions and government-approved non-financial activities
(trade or production) were considerably loosened. The domestic stock market
was opened to foreign investors in 1992 (albeit with ownership ceilings), and
foreigners were allowed into domestic (private and government) bond markets
in 1994. Most crucially, foreign currency loans to domestic borrowers were al-
lowed without prior government approval beginning in 1995.24
With the government abandoning its efforts to regulate foreign capital flows
and direct domestic investment, especially from 1993 onward, the stage was set
for the massive buildup of bad debts and overcapacity problems. From this per-
spective, even if shady accounting practices played a role in the crisis, they were
more likely the result of rapid deregulation than government interference.
Although the statist explanation of the crisis is more accurate then the neo-
liberal one, it is also inadequate. For example, statists still refuse to systemati-
cally explore the connections between the crucial liberalization process and the
structure and dynamics of the South Korean model itself. Most statists treat lib-
eralization as an exogenous factor produced by a “lack of will” on the part of
government officials and/or the shadowy intrigues of the “Wall Street-Treasury-
IMF Complex.”25 But liberalization pressures are not plausibly exogenous in
this context.
Domestically, liberalization pressures reflected the growing power and au-
tonomy of the chaebol, the chaebol’s desire to pursue both domestic and inter-
national profit-making opportunities unencumbered by government controls,
and the concomitant rise of technocrats allied with transnational capitalism
within the South Korean government. Externally, pressures from the United
States and allied multilateral institutions to liberalize both finance and imports
were largely a response to the successes of South Korean firms in penetrating
markets in the United States and other developed countries.
Even when statists are willing to acknowledge some endogeneity in the liber-
alization process, they continue to downplay the existence of contradictions in
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the South Korean growth strategy and the key role they played in generating the
crisis. Ha-Joon Chang, for example, allowed that South Korea’s liberalization of
foreign borrowing “was not entirely a matter of policy choice, as now the big-
gest Korean firms and banks had sufficiently good credit ratings to gain easy ac-
cess to the international financial markets.” But then he obscures the signifi-
cance of that insight by adding that “the Kim government relaxed controls on
foreign borrowing more than was needed, and more importantly, failed to su-
pervise the financial institutions involved in such borrowings adequately”26
(emphasis added).
Noteworthy is Chang’s allowance for some unspecified degree of liberaliza-
tion as “necessary,” and his appeal to credit ratings in international financial
markets as a measure of this “necessity.” Chang goes on to admit that liberaliza-
tion reflected not just a declining “will to conduct selective industrial pol-
icy…with the rise of neoliberal ideology,” but also “the growing power of the
chaebols which wanted to be free of government regulation.”27 However, he
makes no attempt to rethink the logic of a model that inexorably creates such
disruptive power.
Similarly, Chang et al. state that “the decision to liberalize the capital account
substantially was in a sense a consequence of Korea’s economic success,” refer-
ring among other things to “the increased credit ratings of Korean corporations
and banks in the international financial markets,” “continued pressure from the
U.S. government to open up the financial market,” as well as Korea’s campaign
for OECD membership, as factors influencing this decision. But, there is no
follow-up to this recognition other than a brief lamentation over the disman-
tling of “the ‘traditional’ Korean economic system…by the IMF program” after
“the Kim Young Sam government’s liberalization drive.”28
Robert Wade is so desperate to deflect blame away from the statist model that
he ascribes corruption and policy incoherence to an excess of democracy, as-
serting that
in Thailand and South Korea, new civilian democratic regimes corrupted
the central policy-making technocracy and lost focus on national eco-
nomic policies. Government-bank-firm collaboration came to be steered
more by the narrow and short-term interests of shifting coalitions. Their
experience is bad news for the proposition that more competitive politics
yield better policies.29 (emphasis in original)
True, after liberalization began credit was “allocated more on the basis of
bribery and political favor” than economic performance. But not surprisingly,
“due to scale economies in bribery and political influence, credit allocation has
been concentrated to big business groups.”30 Credit policy in this period thus
could be considered “democratic” in only the most plutocratic sense. In short,
Wade’s analysis is yet another example of the statist failure to fully recognize the
growth of liberalization pressures as an endogenous dynamic of the South Ko-
rean model.
Statists have also refused to confront one of the most salient features of the
South Korean growth experience: the country’s long-standing trade deficit
problem. Indeed, except for the brief period in the late 1980s noted above,
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South Korea ran trade and current account deficits for the entire four decades
prior to the crisis. These deficits largely reflect the dependence of South Korea’s
industrialization on imported technologies and intermediate goods, mainly
from Japan. In other words, they were a structural characteristic of the South
Korean model that left growth dependent on the goodwill of Japanese competi-
tors and continued net inflows of capital.31
This dependence became critical beginning in the late 1980s, when the Japa-
nese government and firms responded to South Korea’s export success with ac-
tions designed to undermine South Korean exporters. For example, “in 1990,
the Japanese government decided to ban the export of 200 ultra-modern tech-
nologies to Korea until 1995” to ensure that “Japanese firms will have exploited
much of the market potential of the technologies.”32 More generally, it is doubt-
ful whether the official and private capital inflows (and access to U.S. markets)
required to keep South Korea’s export-led growth machine running could have
been obtained without Korea’s key position in the cold war environment. This re-
ality casts serious doubt on statist claims that the South Korean model was both
sustainable and (at least in large part) replicable in other Third World countries.
This conclusion is reinforced by yet another structural aspect of South Ko-
rea’s trade and payments problems: declining unit export prices and terms of
trade, especially beginning in 1996. The unit export prices of South Korea’s
heavy and chemical industries, which produce the country’s main exports, fell
by 46.3 percent over the years 1996 to 1998.33 South Korea’s terms of trade fell
by more than 20 percent in 1996.34 This decline helps explain the ballooning of
the trade deficit from $2.9 billion in 1994 to $15 billion in 1996. Insofar as stat-
ists have an explanation for this development, it is that the abandonment of in-
dustrial policies led to an unplanned buildup of excess capacity in industrial ex-
port sectors, causing overproduction and falling export prices. It is significant
that the statists, like the neoliberals, blame overproduction problems on mis-
guided government policies, even though they disagree on exactly how these
policies were misguided.
The reality is that South Korea was not alone in facing the overproduction
problems that affected all the East Asian “miracle” economies. Overproduction
was, in large part, an endogenous outcome of the buildup of a regional system
of export-led industrialization created largely by Japanese foreign direct invest-
ments.35 As this system evolved, South Korea faced growing competition from
new Southeast Asian export centers (especially Malaysia, Thailand, and Indone-
sia), and then China.
Making matters worse, South Korean capital was forced to increase its own
foreign direct investment in the region. In some cases South Korean firms
moved to maintain their ties with Japanese firms. In other cases, they moved to
escape rising domestic wages in order to maintain their competitiveness rela-
tive to other regional producers. Regardless of the reason, this process pro-
moted the hollowing out of the South Korean economy and the rapid deteriora-
tion in the country’s trade balance.
Considering the statist evasion of these fundamental dynamics, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that their position is underpinned and shaped by an
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uncritical acceptance of capitalism as the only viable development alternative.
Indeed, most statists would probably admit and even proudly assert their accep-
tance of TINA thinking (albeit in a non-neoliberal form) as the only possible ba-
sis for any kind of progressive policy project at this point in history. Given the
nature of South Korea’s crisis, this perspective, as we see more fully below, seri-
ously limits their ability to help South Korean workers evaluate existing recov-
ery options, much less construct new ones.
I V. Post-Cr is is Restructuring:  Liberal ization and Denational ization
Despite its failure to explain either South Korea’s past growth or recent crisis,
neoliberalism has been embraced (and statism rejected) by those directing
South Korea’s post-crisis restructuring. John Cathie offers the following de-
scription of IMF thinking:
The IMF packages have called into question the Asian model and in partic-
ular the “Korean Model.” The managing director of the IMF, Michael Cam-
dessus, urged the Koreans to start again, by abolishing the industrial
conglomerates, the chaebols, which lie at the very heart of the Korean de-
velopment model. Camdessus, using a literary metaphor from the Spanish
poet Miquel de Unamuno (who “used his ideas as he did his boots; he
wore them out and then threw them away”), urged Korea to scrap its de-
velopment model and begin afresh.36
Neoliberalism’s triumph is largely explained by the fact that the IMF is re-
sponsive to the desires of foreign capital, and foreign capital desires South Ko-
rea’s economic opening. Although the liberalization movement predates the
crisis, the IMF has made good use of the latter to accelerate the former. How-
ever, as John Mathews points out, many of the IMF’s reforms were actually fa-
vored by “a strong lobby within Korea that supports such liberalization and
opening up of the Korean economy.” This lobby — including both chaebol in-
terests and government officials increasingly identifying with transnational cap-
italism rather than national development efforts — “made use of the extraordi-
nary opportunity created by the IMF intervention to transform the Korean
‘model’” in a more liberal direction.37
South Korean economist Moon-Soo Kang provides a useful recounting of the
first stages of the crisis-driven liberalization process:
The government’s schedule of capital market liberalization has been dras-
tically accelerated. Direct borrowings of the corporate sector and foreign
equity participation have been substantially liberalized.…The new market-
opening measures include a complete removal of investment ceilings and
restrictions on foreign investment in the bond and equity markets.
Short-term money market instruments such as certificates of deposit were
also opened to foreign investment, and the money market was fully liber-
alized by 31 December 1998. Hostile takeovers by foreigners were allowed
to encourage the development of merger and acquisition markets.…The
government announced draft legislation that aims to repeal the previous
Foreign Exchange Control Act and Foreign Investment and Foreign Capi-
tal Inducement Act in order to facilitate foreign direct investment and
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accelerate liberalization of foreign exchange transactions. Existing reg-
ulations on land and facilities acquisition by foreigners were almost en-
tirely repealed. The previous positive list system for businesses open to
foreign entry was changed to the negative list system in May 1998.38
The opening of the South Korean economy to foreign investment, combined
with the devaluation of domestic enterprises and the country’s desperate need
for foreign exchange, had an immediate impact on foreign capital inflows — es-
pecially of the “vulture investor” variety. The magnitude of these inflows (to-
gether with the collapse of bank loans during the crisis) help explain why “stock
market-financed investment in South Korea in 1998…was four times what it was
in 1996, while bank-financed investment was 11 percent of its 1996 figure.”39
Foreign acquisitions of domestic firms apparently accounted for the lion’s share
of the record $8.9 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into South
Korea in 1998, an amount equal to more than one-third of the total for the previ-
ous thirty-five years. A new record was set the following year, as an additional
$15.5 billion flowed into the country.40
These vulture investments have already resulted in a significant denational-
ization of South Korean capital. Perhaps the most important example is the
South Korean auto industry, “arguably the most productive sector in the re-
gion,” which “is passing into Western hands.”41 In April 2000, the Renault com-
pany of France purchased Samsung Motors at a price tag “believed to have
[been] $340 million to $350 million…$100 million immediately and the rest
over ten years.”42 Three months after entering a “strategic alliance” with
Daimler-Chrysler in June 2000, Korea’s biggest car company, Hyundai, agreed
to Daimler’s acquisition of a 9 percent ownership stake (with an additional 1
percent to follow).43 Daewoo Motor Company, South Korea’s second largest
carmaker, remains on the selling block. In June 2000 the creditors of the
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Korean Confederation of Trade Unions rally, Seoul, November 1997. In the late 1990s
KCTU organized coordinated strikes and held public demonstrations involving tens of
thousands of workers “to protest planned job and wage cuts as well as the privatization
and denationalization of enterprises.” (Photo: Steve Zeltzer)
bankrupt Daewoo Group began talks with Ford. After Ford walked away from a
preliminary $7 billion agreement, discussions were begun with Daimler-Chrys-
ler and Hyundai about a possible joint bid; but this also led nowhere. In Octo-
ber 2000, GM and Fiat were approached; it appears that they may land the com-
pany for less than half of what Ford had originally offered.44
There have also been important foreign acquisitions in the rest of manufac-
turing. In 1998 Sweden’s Volvo bought Samsung’s construction equipment op-
eration for $570 million.45 In June 1999, Philips Electronics paid $1.6 billion for
a 50 percent stake in LG-LCD, a subsidiary of LG Electronics.46 Less then three
months later, Daewoo agreed to sell its consumer electronics unit to a Beverly
Hills based investment group, Walid Alomar and Associates, for $3.2 billion.47 In
January 2001, the Ssangyong Group was forced to sell a 71 percent share of its
high-tech subsidiary, Ssangyong Information and Communication, to the Car-
lyle Group “for at least 316.8 billion won ($247 million) in cash up front, plus an
additional 145.6 billion won later if Ssangyong Information’s operating profits
double.”48
According to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the value-
added in manufacturing by 149 foreign-invested companies — those with more
than half their equity owned by foreigners — rose sharply in 1999, to 21 percent
of that year’s national total.49 Moreover, the South Korean government contin-
ues to seek foreign buyers for planned privatizations of state-owned corpora-
tions, including Korea Electric Power Corporation and Pohang Iron and Steel
Company.
Transnational capital has also significantly increased its control over South
Korea’s financial sector; we mention two examples here. In September 1999,
the South Korean government sold a controlling share of the previously nation-
alized Korea First Bank to the U.S. investment firm Newbridge Capital for $417
million.50 Another major bank denationalization took place in September 2000,
when a “consortium led by the global investment firm the Carlyle Group and J. P.
Morgan” became “the largest shareholder in South Korea’s Kor Am Bank after
acquiring a 40 percent stake” for approximately $413 million. The Bank of
America already held a 16.8 percent stake in Kor Am.51 The transnationalization
of the South Korean economy is well under way.
V. Post-Cris is Restructur ing:
Concentration and Central ization of Capital
In both free market and statist discussions, liberalization and denationalization
are treated as synonymous with the decline of the chaebol-industrial policy
nexus and the construction of a more “open economy where transparency and
accountability for the use of investment resources is market determined and
where the state withdraws from interference in the economy.”52 However, this
belief that the chaebol could be simply “scrapped” — that South Korea can
somehow “start over from scratch” and remold its system on a free-market basis
from the bottom up — is hopelessly naïve. It ignores the massive problems that
would be created by any wholesale scrapping of the chaebol and, even more im-
portantly, the contradictions built into the crisis-restructuring process itself.
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The media has focused attention on chaebol financial problems. For good
reason, Daewoo has drawn the most attention. This huge multinational, which
had sales of some $60 billion, collapsed in 1999 under the weight of $80 billion
in debts. It was broken up into twelve separate businesses; Daewoo Motors, one
of the twelve, is now itself bankrupt and, as described above, up for sale. Ssang-
yong, another chaebol, is also on the ropes. Even Hyundai faces severe financial
difficulties. Although its debts total only $30 billion, one of its affiliates —
Hyundai Engineering and Construction — is in desperate financial condition.53
However, while the chaebol are far weaker than they used to be, especially
relative to foreign capital, they are far from disappearing from the scene. And it
is state industrial policy that has come to their rescue. Fearing that the collapse
of more chaebol would push the economy back into recession, the government
has “veer[ed] away from painful structural reforms centered on free market
principles and competition.”54 A case in point: responding to government pres-
sure, Hyundai’s creditors agreed in November 2000 to an additional rollover of
“690 billion won ($607.3 million) in loans until the end of the year to stave off
the threat of bankruptcy” hanging over Hyundai Engineering and Construc-
tion.55 This was the largest of 235 government-mandated credit rollovers for
chaebol firms that month — measures needed to hold off the liquidation of
these firms.56 Chaebol credit rollovers were a primary factor forcing the Kim Dae
Jung government to seek National Assembly approval in September 2000 for a
new 50 trillion won ($44 billion) package “to prop up domestic banks.”57
This turned out to be just the beginning. In January 2001, the government
chose six major companies that were in financial difficulty and developed a plan
to save them. “Under orders from the Finance Ministry, state-run Korea Devel-
opment Bank, investment trusts, and several commercial banks will spend up to
$8 billion to buy risky bonds from companies unable to repay debts due this
year [2001]. The proceeds will go to wiping out loans, and the KDB will try to re-
sell most of the bonds with government guarantees.” In addition, the govern-
ment decided to launch a $10.3 billion public works program, with Ssangyong
Cement and Hyundai Engineering and Construction targeted as major benefi-
ciaries.58
In fact, rather than promoting a more competitive economy (in the neo-
liberal sense), the crisis-restructuring process appears to be increasing the con-
centration and centralization of economic power in South Korea. Not surpris-
ingly, given the unequal power structure of business built into the South Korean
model, small- and medium-sized enterprises have shouldered a far bigger share
of the costs of the crisis and restructuring then the big chaebol-connected firms.
In particular, IMF-mandated credit-tightening caused a slew of bankruptcies
among smaller enterprises, “while the giant conglomerates that dominate
South Korea’s economy limp[ed] along, staving off changes that threaten[ed]
their powerful, well-entrenched leaders.” Daily bankruptcies of small or mid-
sized companies rose from fifty to eighty-three after the December 1997 IMF
agreements, and “nearly all of the million-plus people who…lost their jobs”
from December 1997 through August 1998 “were employed by small compa-
nies, not by the top thirty conglomerates, or chaebol.”59
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The Korean Stock Exchange estimates that small- and medium-sized firms
listed on the exchange (defined as those not affiliated with the chaebol, and to-
gether comprising 85 percent of 459 companies surveyed) lost a combined 2.7
trillion won ($2.3 billion) in 1998 while the remaining (chaebol-connected)
firms made a combined profit of 1.6 trillion won ($1.4 billion).60 Indeed, under
the widely held belief that the chaebol were too big to fail, their equity and bond
issues were still popular investments in 1998. As a result, the five biggest
chaebol “raised 3.2 trillion won of equity in the first nine months, more than
four times as much as in the same period a year earlier. Meanwhile, they issued
27 trillion won of bonds, three-quarters of all new issues.”61
In September 1999, the Korean Stock Exchange released a new study of stock
ownership patterns based on data for ninety-one listed companies — all subsid-
iaries of the ten largest chaebol. The results indicated increasingly tight owner-
ship connections among chaebol subsidiaries — the exact opposite of the
“breakup” pattern desired by the IMF. For example, the average stake in a sub-
sidiary held by another subsidiary in the same chaebol rose from 19.9 percent in
January 1998 to 28.7 percent in August 1999. In addition, the average “internal
shareholding” of chaebol affiliates (shares held by owners, relatives, and sister
companies) rose from 27.2 percent just prior to the start of the crisis in late
1997, to 34.6 percent in August 1999. Chung Chul Hong, speaking for the
exchange, interpreted the
results as an indication that
“through capital injections
from one affi l iate to an-
other, chaebol group lead-
ers have increased their
control over their lineup of
subsidiaries.”62
These developments do
not mean that the crisis and
restructuring have not af-
fected chaebol management
structures and operating
procedures. Ironically, the
most important change may
be to reduce the intense
competition between the
chaebol themselves that was
a hallmark of South Korea’s
past industrial policy regime.
In a report on the “‘V Soci-
ety,’ an exclusive club for the
anointed heirs of family pa-
triarchs who run the top con-
glomera tes…a nd for se-
lected successful start-ups,”
418 Critical Asian Studies 33:3 (2001)
Seoul, 4 July 2001. KCTU representatives denounce
the government crackdown on the democratic labor
movement and the mass arrests of KCTU leaders and
members. (Credit: Nodong Net/Korean LaborNet)
the Far Eastern Economic Review noted the group’s apparent recognition of
the need “to change the corporate culture” in South Korea:
That means breaking down the tribalism and excess that characterized
chaebol behavior for 40 years. It means breaking into e-business, not by
gobbling up smaller rivals but by helping them and profiting from their
success. It means sharing business secrets and forming alliances with old
enemies. In some cases it means cooperating on projects and even merg-
ing units with affiliates of rival chaebols to gain an edge in the global mar-
ketplace.63
While it is certainly too soon to predict whether such initiatives will produce
fundamental changes in relations between the chaebol and thus the structure of
the South Korean economy, one thing remains clear: neoliberal policies have
not led to a more decentralized distribution of economic power. The Far East-
ern Economic Review leaves no doubt that power remains highly concentrated
in much the same hands as before:
In some ways, however, V Society fits snugly into the old world. It’s a
rarified inner circle, reflecting the cozy ties between various elites that
contributed to the economy’s downfall in 1997. Meetings are held in a
700-square-metre rented space in a seven-story office building, with the
society’s logo prominently displayed on the lobby wall. Votes to admit
new members must be unanimous. If even one member objects, the appli-
cant is rejected.64
In short, neoliberalism stands revealed as a purely ideological construction —
one as openly contradictory as the system it serves.
VI . Post-Cris is Restructur ing:
The Social  Costs
The social costs associated with the restructuring process described above have
been heavy and largely paid by working people. For example, South Korean
firms have been rapidly replacing regular full-time workers with contingent la-
bor. As the Korea Herald reports, “The number of irregular workers, which in-
cludes part-timers and short-term employees whose contracts run for a year or
less, has rapidly grown since the currency crisis in 1997 sent the unemployment
rate to a record high…. As of June [2000], irregular workers made up 53 percent
of the nation’s 13.3 million paid workers.”65
This growing declassification of jobs to irregular status has tended to distort
much of the published data on working-class conditions thereby giving a highly
misleading picture of the restructuring’s social costs. An example: government
data shows a rapid recovery in full-time workers’ wages since the crisis. But this
improvement is far less significant given the rapid fall in full-time work. Simi-
larly, government statistics show a large decline in the official unemployment
rate from its crisis peak. But this decline is deceiving, since part-time workers
are counted as fully employed even though most work fewer hours than “regu-
lar” workers and are desperate for full-time work. Also, the official unemploy-
ment rate would be much higher if it included those who have stopped looking
for work out of despair.66
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The fact that the official data on average wages and unemployment under-
state the human costs of the crisis is clear from the surge in suicides and home-
lessness since 1997 — much of which involves elderly people who do not want
to burden their economically strapped children and grandchildren. In 1998,
the measured suicide rate for South Koreans sixty years of age or more was
twenty per 100,000, almost three times the rate of ten years ago.67 Seoul’s 150
government shelters do not begin to provide adequate space for the more than
10,000 homeless now roaming its streets in a daily struggle for physical survival.
Many more casual laborers share cramped rented quarters that absorb most of
their meager wages.68
These labor market trends have also contributed to a widening gap between
rich and poor. Over the years 1970 to 1997, the country’s Gini index held steady
at 0.283. It jumped to 0.316 in 1998, and then to 0.321 in 1999, where it remained
during the first half of 2000.69 This development is reflected in people’s own
self-assessment of their declining social position: “Those who think of them-
selves as middle class decreased from 63.7 percent prior to the crisis to 48.8 per-
cent in 1998, and declined further in 1999 to 38.4 percent. At the same time,
those who think of themselves as lower-income increased from 50.4 percent in
1998 to 61.3 percent in 1999.”70
This outcome is not accidental. It is the result of capital’s desire for greater
“labor flexibility” to solve its problems of profitability and competitiveness.
And, it has been the state that has actively managed and enforced this class-
biased distribution of costs. Moreover just as with liberalization of finance and
trade, the state’s actions cannot simply be understood as the result of a capitula-
tion to IMF demands for a new labor policy. A case in point is the labor law
adopted by the National Assembly in March 1997 that featured a sweeping
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Seoul, 4 July 2001. A line of police confronts demonstrating KCTU labor activists.
“[W]ithout a counter-vision [to neoliberalism-statism] supported by a majority of working
people, the labor movement will be forced to continue its largely defensive battle against
government and IMF initiatives — a battle it is not likely to win.” (Credit: Nodong Net/Korean
LaborNet. Courtesy: Myoung Joon Kim)
“flexibilization” of labor-management relations. Measures included the legaliza-
tion of layoffs, allowance for extended daily work-times, prohibition of wildcat
strikes, and the right to use substitute workers during union strikes.71
The passage of this law eight months prior to the eruption of the crisis helps
explain why South Korean officials had no problem accepting a measure “eas-
ing restrictions in the labor market over redundancies (to enable businesses to
move from one industry to another)” in the December 1997 IMF agreements. As
a matter of fact, insiders to the negotiations have reported that South Korea, not
the IMF, suggested the labor-flexibility measure.72 Both private business and the
government have taken full advantage of these legal sanctions to impose the
wage cuts, layoffs, and wholesale conversion of jobs from full-time and perma-
nent to part-time and contingent status, as highlighted above.
The state’s role in this exploitative capital-restructuring dynamic has not
been limited to legislative actions. It has also engaged in the violent repression
of workers’ resistance. The government’s spy networks and wiretaps enable it
to launch preemptive strikes against workers’ organizations — such as when
the police conducted a sneak attack against striking workers at the Lotte Hotel
on 29 June 2000, tear-gassing and savagely beating the unionists including one
pregnant worker, who suffered a miscarriage, before dragging some one
thousand demonstrators off to jail.73
Similarly, the government has refused to allow Daewoo’s workers an oppor-
tunity to mobilize public support for a more worker/community-oriented re-
structuring of Daewoo’s auto subsidiary. On 10 April 2000, “The government is-
sued a strong warning against auto workers who were on their fourth day of
strikes to protest a proposed sale of the Daewoo Motor Company to a foreign
buyer”; the government said it would “sternly deal with illegal strikes related to
the sale of Daewoo Motor.”74 The threat was backed up with a police raid “in
which 20 labor activists were arrested.”75
Increasingly desperate to sell the company to a foreign buyer, South Korean
authorities are determined to gain union acceptance of mass layoffs. Indeed, by
November 2000, Daewoo Motor’s creditors were refusing to provide the fresh
loans needed to keep the company running — unless, that is, “the carmaker’s
union accepted a plan to cut wages and lay off as many as 3,500 workers, or
one-third of its domestic work force.”76 The government, domestic creditors,
and the international business press all vilified the Daewoo workers for their
unwillingness to shoulder their rightful share of the costs of a painful but “un-
avoidable” restructuring.
As the New York Times put it: “Resistance by labor unions is seen as a major
obstacle to South Korea’s efforts to liquidate or sell debt-laden businesses, a
move that is crucial to restoring foreign investor confidence in the economy.”77
The Times barely paused to note that the Daewoo workers had not been paid
two months’ back wages, and that the payment of these back wages was the un-
ion’s sole condition for entering serious negotiations over the terms of restruc-
turing. Instead, the main emphasis was on the inevitability of mass layoffs, given
that such “reorganization” was “demanded by potential foreign investors, in-
cluding G.M.”78
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It is important to point out that statists have generally been hostile to worker
attempts to find alternatives to neoliberal restructuring. Indeed, they have gen-
erally supported the neoliberal view that working-class opposition to “labor
market flexibility” is a major obstacle to successful restructuring. This, for exam-
ple, is Ha-Joon Chang’s view, although he dresses it up with utopian appeals for
non-existent capital-labor collaboration:
Making redundancy easier by changing the labor laws may actually be de-
sirable, if combined with well-managed unemployment insurance pro-
gram and retraining schemes, as the current system of quasi-lifetime
employment and company-based welfare provision tends to favor the
workers in the large firms. But, this requires sea changes in the Korean at-
titudes and institutions regarding job security, taxation and the welfare
state, corporate recruitment and pay structure, and industrial training —
something that cannot be achieved without a careful consensus-building
process and a well-designed program for institutional reform.79
So much for the neoliberal-statist dichotomy. Both sides see only one answer to
the current crisis: capitalist profitability and competitiveness must be restored
and the working class must bear the costs.
VI I . B eyond TI NA:  Future Struggles
After declining by 6.7 percent in 1998, South Korea’s economy grew by 10.7 per-
cent in 1999 and approximately 9 percent in 2000. Both neoliberal and statist
economists were quick to declare an end to the nation’s economic troubles.
Neoliberals claimed that the turnaround was due to the effectiveness of their re-
structuring efforts; statists claimed it proved that the South Korean model was
in far better shape than neoliberals would admit. However, these growth figures
present a highly misleading picture of South Korea’s true economic situation.
The forces driving South Korea’s recent growth appear to be running out of
steam. For example, massive inflows of foreign capital helped the country over-
come its initial debt problems. A large percentage of these funds came from the
$58 billion bailout package arranged by the IMF. This source cannot easily be
tapped again. Foreign direct investment provided the other significant source
of foreign funds. But it is doubtful that these inflows can be sustained at recent
levels. One of the most important reasons is that a lot of this investment was for
mergers and acquisitions, and the best deals have already been made. There are
already signs of a slowdown: cumulative foreign direct investment as of the end
of November 2000 totaled $13.70 billion, far short of government expectations
of $16 billion. Investment in November itself was $1.54 billion, 50.5 percent
lower than the total in the same month in the previous year.80
Exports have also been critical to South Korea’s recovery. The country’s ex-
port drive was initially aided by a sharp currency decline. That currency advan-
tage has been lessened. Even more importantly, South Korea’s exports have be-
come increasingly limited to a few information technology products, and these
goods remain subject to fierce regional competition. As a result, South Korea’s
exporters are facing a new profit squeeze. The Korea International Trade Associ-
ation export profitability index in 1999 was 15.1 percent lower than in 1998 and
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9.0 percent lower than in 1997. And, the index continued to fall in 2000.81
Equally serious, South Korean export growth remains heavily dependent on
U.S. market conditions. But the U.S. economy — and the American demand for
information technology products — is rapidly slowing. South Korean forecast-
ers have lowered their predictions for growth in 2001 to approximately 4 per-
cent, less than half the rate in 2000.
If the U.S. economy actually falls into recession, things could get much
worse. “Samsung Securities estimates that 30 percent of listed nonfinancial com-
panies don’t earn enough profit, even in a healthy economy, to cover interest
payments. Net profits of the top five companies were 79 percent of total corpo-
rate profits in the third quarter [of 2000]. That means that the big guns make
enough to cover interest and shed debt, but that many second- and third-tier
companies are as highly leveraged as ever.”82 Banks are already limiting credit to
struggling companies. A decline in export earnings could push many into bank-
ruptcy, perhaps pushing South Korea back into outright recession. And if work-
ing people find social conditions harsh when the economy is growing over 9
percent a year, one can only guess how bad conditions will become with a sharp
slowdown in growth.
Workers, to the disappointment of both neoliberals and statists, are increas-
ingly demonstrating their unwillingness to be sacrificed for the benefit of capi-
talist restructuring efforts. Even the Wall Street Journal has noticed the “recent
surge of labor disputes and strikes in Korea.” Noting with alarm that “labor un-
ions are stepping up their fight against corporate restructuring,” the article con-
cluded: “These days…workers appear less willing to accept economic reform
efforts.”83
In May 1998, for example, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
(KCTU) organized a wave of coordinated strikes, involving roughly 120,000
workers, to protest planned job and wage cuts as well as the privatization and
denationalization of enterprises. The KCTU followed this up with a series of
rolling strikes and public demonstrations, each involving tens of thousands of
workers, in late 1998 and throughout the first half of 1999.
As has often been the case historically, women workers have been an active if
not leading force in the recent struggles of South Korean workers. In August
1999, “a group of women formed the country’s first women’s union…and have
their hands full since female employees are among the hardest hit by South Ko-
rea’s economic woes.” Women workers tended to be the first laid off during the
1997-98 crisis, and they remain concentrated in smaller enterprises and “tem-
porary” jobs. In addition, they have borne an inordinate share of job losses asso-
ciated with the movement of light-industrial export production to lower wage
areas in Southeast Asia and China. Accordingly, “the Women’s Trade Union aims
to be a forum for all women workers, including those who have lost their jobs
and with that, their involvement in union activities. This is significant since Ko-
rean law bars the unemployed from joining a union.”84
When considering which workers are most likely to show a high degree of
combativeness during periods of economic crisis and heightened job-insecu-
rity, bankers and brokers are not the ones who first come to mind. Yet some of
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the strongest worker resistance to capitalist restructuring in South Korea has
been in the financial sector. On 4 July 2000, 90 percent of the 65,000 bank work-
ers belonging to the Korean Federation of Bank and Financial Labor Unions
voted to set a strike deadline for 11 July in order to protest government restruc-
turing plans calling for a merger of three state-owned banks and for major lay-
offs. The strike ended after only one day, when the government agreed to sus-
pend its merger plan.85
Perhaps the most encouraging development in the post-crisis class struggle
has been the growing organization and militancy of contingent (or “irregular”)
workers, often in cooperation with regular full-timers. Strikes by “irregular
workers have occurred at a dozen workplaces” in South Korea, “with partici-
pants demanding an upgrade in their status to protect them from various forms
of discrimination, including low pay and job insecurity.…Trade unions at these
firms are also demanding that short-term employees be allowed to unionize.”86
A particularly crucial action was the summer 2000 sit-in strike by the Lotte
Hotel Union. This strike was successfully concluded on 21 August when, after
“seven days of heated negotiations, the management finally agreed to the un-
ion’s demands for leniency for those who participated in the strike, a 10 percent
pay raise and the extension of the retirement age to fifty-six. Most importantly,
management gave the nod to the union’s call for all contract and part-time
workers to be granted regular staff status after three years of employment.”87 To
achieve these gains, the Lotte workers had to go through a two-month period
during which management refused to negotiate (following a sham process of
government “arbitration”), as well as a violent attack by police. The spirits of the
Lotte workers were bolstered by rank-and-file solidarity actions, such as the
fourteen-city rally on 20 July in which more than 20,000 KCTU members partici-
pated. In their defensive struggles against capitalist restructuring, South Korean
workers have demonstrated a great class consciousness and fighting spirit. In-
deed, their efforts have prevented the full implementation of labor flexibilization
and enterprise-reorganization measures approved in the wake of the crisis. How-
ever, defensive struggles alone, no matter how valiant and militant, will not help
workers overcome the negative effects of existing restructuring dynamics.
It is in this context of the need for a new vision and strategy for social transfor-
mation that statist thinking most clearly demonstrates its bankruptcy. South Ko-
rean workers are opposed to neoliberalism because its policy agenda is destruc-
tive of their working and living conditions. Statists claim to offer an alternative
to neoliberalism but, as we have seen, it is a limited alternative that is unable to
help workers shift their country’s economic development onto a more worker/
community-oriented path. Unfortunately, too many labor leaders and activists
have not yet grasped the limits of, and thus remain politically trapped by, the
neoliberal-statist debate.88 They need to move beyond questions of whether the
chaebol and industrial policy are good or bad to see that what is needed is the
creation of a new political economy that is not bound by the class contradictory
nature of capitalism.
This is no simple task. Nonetheless, without a counter-vision supported by
a majority of working people, the labor movement will be forced to continue
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its largely defensive battle against government and IMF initiatives — a battle it
is not likely to win. Therefore, if the KCTU is to help South Korean workers
successfully challenge the ongoing transnationalization of the South Korean
economy, it must find ways to help rebuild a broad-based left movement within
the country and promote greater regional and global labor solidarity.89
As a first step in this direction, the KCTU should encourage left-oriented ac-
tivists from the labor, urban poor peoples’, farmers’, and NGO movements to
come together and hammer out a shared understanding of current economic
and political dynamics. To be economically accurate and politically resonant,
this shared understanding must go beyond the currently dominant tendency to
simply blame the chaebol, neoliberalism, or both, without directly addressing
the fundamental class character of the crisis-restructuring process.90 Hopefully
the arguments and analysis presented in this paper can provide some back-
ground for the necessary discussions.
Given a shared perspective on crisis and restructuring, the next step should
be the formulation of a progressive program of action. Such a program can help
cement a broad, working-class-centered, social alliance and provide a vehicle
for popular organizing. The goals of such a program would likely include
strengthening popular resistance to neoliberal reforms; building new organiza-
tional mechanisms to promote greater popular education, mobilization, and
participation in political and economic decision making; and a reorientation of
economic activity away from exporting toward meeting domestic needs in an
ecologically sensitive and technologically sustainable manner. Such a broad-
based socialist action program should also provide a framework within which
the KCTU and its member unions could engage and strengthen ties with the un-
organized and unemployed.
Finally, the KCTU and other worker-community organizations should step up
their efforts to build solidarity with their counterparts in other countries, inside
and outside East Asia. Given the regional nature of the accumulation process in
East Asia, and the crucial role of this regionalization in South Korea’s economic
crisis and restructuring, coordinated struggles are bound to become more cen-
tral to national organizing efforts. South Korean attempts at radical transforma-
tion are bound to gain credibility when supported by complementary efforts in
other countries, especially those in the region. The objective conditions for re-
gional solidarity have certainly been enhanced by the crisis, as workers in Japan,
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia face growing hardships as a
result of similar (and in many cases the same) dynamics of competition and ac-
cumulation.91 And, just as the working class must move beyond the free mar-
ket-statist dichotomies afflicting mainstream national policy debates, it must
also develop class-informed visions of regional development counterpoised
to the regional integration schemes proposed (always in top-down fashion,
with no allowance for worker/community input) by both free market and stat-
ist economists.92
We recognize that what we are advocating will not produce a quick fix for
South Korea’s economic and social problems. Its strength is that while building
unity for resistance to capitalist restructuring and competitive pressures, it also
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lays necessary groundwork for the long-term struggle for socialism. The out-
come of this struggle obviously has significance far beyond South Korea. It is
therefore crucial that activist-intellectuals worldwide learn more about the
South Korean experience and find ways of engaging with, and offering support
to, South Korean social movements. Only in this way can we hope to create de-
velopment visions and programs that contribute to the movement toward a
new economic system centered on human needs instead of profitability and
mutually destructive competition.
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